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In this paper we propose a protocol
of quantum communication to achieve
Byzantine agreement among multiple par-
ties. The striking feature of our proposal
in comparison to the existing protocols is
that we do not use entanglement to achieve
the agreement. There are two stages in
our protocol. In the first stage, a list of
numbers that satisfies some special prop-
erties is distributed to every participant
by a group of semi-honest list distributors
via quantum secure communication. Then,
in the second stage those participants ex-
change some information to reach agree-
ment.
Keywords: Byzantine agreement; quan-
tum communication; distributed comput-
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1 Introduction
A fundamental problem in distributed computing
is to reach agreement in the presence of faulty
processes. For example, a database can be repli-
cated on several computers, which ensures access
to the database even if some of the computers
are not functional. For the consistency of data,
all computers must preserve the same contents.
To achieve this goal, a protocol that ensures all
computers adopt the same update of the database
is needed. This problem is intuitively formulated
as the Byzantine generals problem [13, 10]:
“Three generals of the Byzantine army want to
decide upon a common plan of action: either to
attack (0) or to retreat (1). They can only com-
municate in pairs by sending messages. One of
the generals, the commanding general, must de-
cide on a plan of action and communicate it to
the other generals. However, one of the generals
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might be a traitor, trying to keep the loyal gen-
erals from agreeing on a plan. How to find a way
in which all loyal generals follow the same plan?”
If the generals communicate with each other
only by pairwise classical channels, the Byzantine
generals problem is provably unsolvable [13, 10].
Even if pairwise quantum channels are used, it
will not help to solve this problem [5]. However
a variation of the Byzantine agreement problem,
called detectable Byzantine agreement (DBA),
can be solved by using quantum resources. A
DBA protocol ensures that, either all loyal gen-
erals agree upon a common plan or all abort. In
addition, if all generals are loyal, then they agree
upon a common plan.
In 2001, Fitzi et al. [6] presented a DBA proto-
col for three parties using pairwise quantum chan-
nels and entangled qutrits. Cabello [4] proposed
a three-party DBA protocol based on a four-qubit
singlet state. Iblisdir and Gisin [8] developed an
improvement of the protocol of Fitzi et al. [6] by
showing that the DBA problem can be solved by
using two quantum key distribution channels and
three classical authenticated channels. Gaertner
et al. [7] introduced a new DBA protocol based
on four-qubit entangled state. An experimental
implementation of the protocol is also presented
in Gaertner et al. [7]. A device-independent
quantum scheme for the Byzantine generals prob-
lem is provided in Rahaman et al. [14].
All the aforementioned DBA protocols have
only considered the situation of three parties.
In actual distributed computing or blockchains
[12, 1], the number of parties involved is signif-
icantly larger than three. Ben-Or and Hassidim
[2], Tavakoli et al. [17] and Luo et al. [11] devel-
oped DBA protocols for multiple parties based on
high-dimensional entangled states. These states
are difficult to realize by the current technology.
In this paper, we will develop a new DBA pro-
tocol for multiple parties. The striking feature
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of our protocol compared to existing protocols is
that no entanglement is used in our protocol. The
only quantum technology that we use is quantum
key distribution [3], which is a relatively matured
topic of research and has recently attracted the
interest of the industry.
In Section 2 we will introduce our protocol.
Then, in Section 3, we will analyse the proper-
ties of our protocol. We shall conclude the paper
with future work in Section 4.
2 Quantum Byzantine agreement
without entanglement
Let us begin with formal definitions of Byzantine
agreement.
Definition 1 [Byzantine agreement (BA) proto-
col [6]] A protocol among n parties such that one
distinct party S (the sender) holds an input value
xs ∈ D (for some finite domain D) and all other
parties (the receivers) eventually decide on an
output value in D is said to achieve Byzantine
agreement if the protocol guarantees that all hon-
est parties decide on the same output value y ∈ D
and that y = xs whenever the sender is honest.
Definition 2 [Detectable Byzantine agreement
(DBA) protocol [6]] A protocol among n par-
ties such that one sender S holds an input value
xs ∈ D and all other receivers eventually decide
on an output value in D is said to achieve de-
tectable Byzantine agreement if the protocol guar-
antees the following:
1. Agreement: Either all honest parties abort
the protocol, or all honest parties decide on
the same output value y ∈ D.
2. Validity: If all parties are honest, then they
decide on the same output value y = xs.
Now we introduce our DBA protocol. There
are two stages of our protocol. The aim of the
first stage is to distribute correlated lists of num-
bers among the parties involved in the protocol.
We will call such a list reference list since the
parties refer to that lists to check whether the
information they receive is trustworthy. Then in
the second stage, parties use the reference lists to
achieve consensus. We assume the existance of
semi-honsest parties to handle the task of refer-
ence list distribution. This assumption is similar
as in Luo et al. [11]. For a party to be semi-
honest mens that the party acts according to the
description of the protocol, but may disclose in-
formation with a certain probability p, 0 < p < 1.
We further assume the parties are connected by
pairwise authenticated, error-free, synchronous,
classical and quantum channels.
2.1 Stage 1: List distribution
Let {P1, . . . , Pn, Pn+1, . . . , Pn+d} be a set of par-
ties. Let further P1 be the sender of the DBA pro-
tocol, P2, . . . , Pn be receivers and Pn+1, . . . , Pn+d
be list distributors. To distinguish the sender and
the receivers from the distributors we shall also
call the former two participants. The schema of
the system architecure is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The schema of the system including one sender
P1, two receivers P2 and P3, and two list distributors P4
and P5. All parties are linked via classical and quantum
channels (lines in the diagram represent the presence
of both channels). In this paper we assume that each
participant is connected to any other (except of connec-
tions between list distributors which do not exchange
any messages between one another), but some of the
connections may not necessary need to be both classical
and quantum. We plan a detailed study of this issue
as future work. For now we can say that the quantum
channels between list distributors and participants are
essential.
We assume that Pn+1, . . . , Pn+d are semi-
honest. For every party Pi ∈ {Pn+1, . . . , Pn+d},
the task of Pi is to use the technique of quantum
secure communication (communicate with the en-
cryption/decryption keys distributed by quantum
key distribution) to send a list of numbers Lik
(a reference list) to each Pk ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn} such
that the following is satisfied:
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1. For all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |Lik| = m for some
integer m which is a multiple of 6.
2. Li1 ∈ {0, 1, 2}m. m3 numbers on Li1 are 0. m3
numbers on Li1 are 1. m3 numbers on Li1 are
2.
3. For all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, Lik ∈ {0, 1}m.
4. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if Li1[j] = 0, then
Li2[j] = . . . = Lin[j] = 0.
5. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if Li1[j] = 1, then
Li2[j] = . . . = Lin[j] = 1.
6. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if Li1[j] = 2, then
for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n} the probability that
Lik[j] = 0 and that Lik[j] = 1 are equal (i.e.
the numbers of occurences of 0 and 1 are
equal in the list).
Distributors create their lists independently so
for different i and j the lists Li1 and Li1 may
be different (indeed the probability that they are
the same is quite small). After the lists are dis-
tributed, P1, . . . , Pn use sequential composition
to form a longer list to be used in the next stage:
L1 = Ln+11 . . . Ln+d1 , . . . , Ln = Ln+1n . . . Ln+dn .
Obviously L2 = L3 = ... = Ln. We will call the
longer lists combined reference lists. Notice that
every distributor contributes 1d to the combined
reference lists.
2.2 Stage 2: reaching agreement
Now, the parties P1, . . . , Pn run the following
steps to reach an agreement:
1. P1 sends a binary number b1,k to all Pk, k ∈
{2, . . . , n}. Together with b1,k, P1 sends to
Pk the list of numbers ID1,k, which indicate
all positions of b1,k on the list L1. The length
of ID1,k is to be m3 , where m is the length of
L1. P1 use b1,k as the final value it outputs.
2. Pk checks the obtained message (b1,k, ID1,k)
against his own reference list Lk. If the anal-
ysis of Pk shows that (b1,k, ID1,k) is consis-
tent with Lk, then he sends (b1,k, ID1,k) to
all other receivers Pj , j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Here
(b1,k, ID1,k) is consistent with Lk means that
for all index x ∈ ID1,k, Lk[x] = b1,k. How-
ever, if (b1,k, ID1,k) is not consistent with Lk,
then Pk immediately ascertains that P1 is
dishonest and sends to other receivers Pj , j ∈
{2, . . . , n} message: ⊥, meaning: “I have re-
ceived an inconsistent message”. To acknowl-
edge the fact that every receiver knows his
own output, we formally assume that each
of them receives a message from himself.
3. After all messages have been exchanged be-
tween the receivers every Pk analyzes the
data received from P2, . . . , Pn and acts ac-
cording to the following criteria:
(a) If there is a set of receivers H with
|H| ≥ 2 such that
i. for all j ∈ H, (bj,k, IDj,k) is consis-
tent with Lk, and
ii. for some i, j ∈ H, bi,k 6= bj,k,
then Pk sets his output value to be ⊥.
(b) If there is a set of receivers H with
|H| ≥ 2 such that for all j ∈ H,
(bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk and
all bj,k are the same, and for all i 6∈ H,
(bi,k, IDi,k) is not consistent with Lk,
then Pk sets his output value to be bj,k.
(c) If there is a set of receivers H with
|H| ≥ 2 such that for all j ∈ H,
(bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk and
all bj,k are the same, and for all i 6∈ H,
the message sent by Pi is ⊥, then Pk
sets his output value to be bj,k.
(d) In all other cases, Pk sets his value to
be ⊥.
The criteria (a) - (d) are crucial for our pro-
tocol. Let us now briefly explain the rationale
behind them. In a nutshell, the most important
factor here is the following claim:
Theorem 1 For all k, j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, Pk believes
that Pj is honest whenever (bj,k, IDj,k) is consis-
tent with Lk.
Proof 1 We prove the theorem by showing that
if Pj is dishonest then the probability that Pj sets
(bj,k, IDj,k) to be consistent with Lk is extremely
small.
Suppose Pj is dishonest. Now Pj wants to send
(bj,k, IDj,k) to Pk such that (bj,k, IDj,k) is con-
sistent with Lk. In the case when Pj received a
consistent message from P1 it must be the case
that bj,k 6= b1,j, otherwise Pj would be honest.
Note that in Lj = Lk, there are m2 positions on
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which bj,k appears. But on L1, there are only m3
positions on which bj,k appears. We say that a po-
sition x is a discord position iff L1[x] = 2. If Pj
selects a discord position x and puts it into IDj,k,
then with probability 12 it will be that Lk[x] 6= bj,k.
To ensure that (bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent with Lk,
Pj has to make a correct choice on all discord
positions. The probability of making a correct
choice on all discord positions is (12)
m
3 , which is
extremely small whenm is relatively large. There-
fore, if it is the case that (bj,k, IDj,k) is consistent
with Lk, then Pk can conclude that Pj is honest.
Thus, any receiver Pk can conclusively deduce
about any other receiver Pj what follows:
• If Pj has sent a message consistent with Lk,
then Pj is honest.
• If Pj has sent a message inconsistent with
Lk, then Pj is dishonest.
• If Pj has sent ⊥, then Pj may be honest or
dishonest. However, if in this case Pj is hon-
est, then P1 must be dishonest.
The rationale of criterion (a) follows from The-
orem 1. Pk can conclude that Pi and Pj are hon-
est when (bi,k, IDi,k) and (bj,k, IDj,k) are consis-
tent with Lk. Now, if in addition bi,k 6= bj,k,
Pk can safely conclude that the sender (P1) is
dishonest. Conequently all the messages are not
trustworthy and the output ⊥ is adequate for the
situation.
As for criterion (b) according to Theorem 1 we
may conclude that all the receivers from the set
H are honest and all other are not. Thus, H is
the set of all honest receivers and their common
message is trustworthy. Criterion (c) is similar
to (b). Receivers from H here are also honest.
However in this case some participants who are
not in H may also be honest. The honest ones
finally will change their output value from ⊥ to
bj,k. For safety reasons with respect to the agree-
ment condition of DBA presented in definition 2
by criterion (d) in all other cases honest parties
abort our protocol by setting their output to ⊥.
3 Analysis of the protocol
Now let us analyze the performance of our pro-
tocol under an attack of an adversary. We make
the following assumption about the adversary:
1. The adversary can control a fixed set of par-
ticipants and let those participants send ar-
bitrary messages at his will. A participant
is dishonest if and only if he is controlled by
the adversary. The amount of honest partic-
ipants is ≥ 3.
2. The adversary can bribe the list distributors
to disclose certain information. When being
bribed, a list distributor will disclose infor-
mation with probability p.
3. The adversary has unlimited computing
power.
In short, the adversary is static, Byzantine and
with unlimited computing power.
Theorem 2 Our protocol satisfies agreement
and validity under the attack of an adversary.
Proof 2 It’s easy to see that validity is satisfied.
Indeed, if none of the participants is controlled
by the adversary, then they behave as the proto-
col specifies. Even if the adversary collects infor-
mation from a large number of list distributors,
the correlated list of numbers will still be correctly
distributed. All participants will send consistent
messages and the same output value will be estab-
lished.
We now turn to the proof of agreement. First,
note that the adversary can hardly have com-
plete information of the combined reference lists
(L1, . . . , Ln). By our assumption, every list dis-
tributor is semi-honest. They will disclose the
content of the list that they distributed with prob-
ability p < 1, if the adversary bribes them.
Since every list distributor contributes only 1d to
the lists, to collect complete information about
L1, . . . , Ln, the adversary must bribe all d list
distributors and still the probability of collecting
complete information is pd, which decreases ex-
ponentially as d grows. For those list distribu-
tors that the adversary does not bribe, the adver-
sary cannot collect any information because the
lists are distributed by quantum secure communi-
cation. The unlimited computing power the ad-
versary has is not helpful in this case. Therefore,
we conclude that the first stage of our protocol can
be correctly and safely executed.
Now we consider the second stage. If the sender
is honest, then there are at least 2 honest re-
ceivers. All honest receivers will receive the same
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consistent data from the sender. Those honest
receivers will forward the same data to other par-
ticipants. Therefore, according to criterion (a) in
our protocol, all honest participants will output
the same value as the sender. If the sender P1 is
dishonest, then there are 2 cases:
1. All honest receivers receive consistent data.
In this case there are two sub-cases:
(a) All honest receivers receive the same
data. In this case, according to cri-
terion (b), all honest participants will
output the same value as the sender.
(b) Not all honest receivers receive the same
data. Then, according to criterion (a),
all honest receivers will abort the proto-
col (output ⊥).
2. Not all honest receivers receive consistent
data. In this case, if there are still two re-
ceivers that receive the same and consistent
data and all dishonest receivers output ⊥,
then according to criterion (c) all honest re-
ceivers will output the same value. Other-
wise, according to criteria (a) or (d) all hon-
est receivers will output ⊥.
Therefore, in all possible cases, the agreement
is achieved.
The above proof also implies an interesting
property of our protocol which is stronger than
validity. We present it as a corollary.
Corollary 1 Our protocol satisfies the following
honest-success property under the attack of an ad-
versary: if the sender is honest, then all honest
parties decide on the same output as the sender.
4 Conclusion and future work
We have proposed a protocol of quantum commu-
nication to achieve Byzantine agreement among
multiple parties. The striking feature of our pro-
tocol, compared to existing protocols, is that it
does not use entanglement. The success of our
protocol relies on the distribution of sequences of
correlated numbers, which in turn relies on the
unconditional security of quantum key distribu-
tion.
We also assume the participation of semi-
honest list distributors in the protocol. This as-
sumption is the cost to pay for not using en-
tanglement. Since a low-dimensional entangle-
ment can be implemented by current technol-
ogy, in the future we will study whether semi-
honest distributors could be replaced by a low-
dimensional entanglement. One potential appli-
cation of our DBA protocol is in the field of quan-
tum blockchain [9, 16, 15]. In the future we plan
to apply our protocol to quantum blockchain to
solve particular problems such as auction, lottery
and multi-party secure computation.
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